A more promising option is to focus on groups rather than individuals. It could be argued, for example, that rich countries have a duty to reduce poverty in poor countries. With this (plausible) hypothesis, one could then argue that if rich countries collectively offer money to poor nations (but only) in exchange for organs, it is not really an offer, but rather a threat (a threat to unfairly withhold resources if they do not hand over organs). Rich nations (they say) should give the money anyway and not demand organs for it. So what rich nations are doing is threatening to withhold the resources to which poor nations have a moral right, unless poor nations hand over organs: a seemingly clear case of coercion. There are three main positive arguments in favour of approving the sale of organs. Recently, some scientists have questioned whether organ sales and “risky work” are as similar as they may seem. Malmqvist (2015), for example, argues that it is not clear that kidney sales and unsafe jobs really carry comparable risks, overall. An initial reaction to “coercion through poverty” tells us that almost all advocates of organ sales are not advocating unhindered international trade in transplanted organs, but a regulated compensation system. In the context of a regulated system (especially the one advocated by Erin and Harris, which would be limited to a single economic field), there is no reason to believe that most organ sellers are desperately poor. Selling organs may certainly be more attractive to those with the least money (because why would someone rich need or want to sell an organ?), but then the same can be said of some of the agricultural jobs and the lowest paid and lowest paid, and we generally don`t say that people can`t agree, or that these types of jobs should be prohibited. Essentially, the pros and cons of the argument for a legal organ market are difficult to weigh. Monetary rewards for organs cause problems where the poor are disadvantaged.
Yet compensating donors is an easy way to dramatically increase the supply of organs and save thousands of lives each year. In both cases, there will be ethical dilemmas. However, it is obvious that if the United States wants to eliminate the current waiting list, something must change. If it is heavily regulated, it is not impossible to have a system that both eliminates the waiting list for kidneys and protects donors from exploitation. Iran is an excellent example; Building on their foundations, the United States, along with other countries currently struggling to meet the demand for organs, could use the Iranian model to meet demand and reduce the exploitation risks often associated with the organ market. He seems to hope that in the coming years, as research continues on this topic, a more viable solution to the demand for organs in the United States will be implemented. Nevertheless, the rising rate of kidney disease means that some patients are not receiving the transplant they expect. This lack of organs has led to proposals to lift the payment ban, which has been part of the U.S. Organ Donation Act since 1984.
But buying organs would be a mistake. And in addition to being false, it would also harm existing voluntary donation programs and be ineffective in increasing organ supply. There are better ways to increase the number of donated organs than to pay for donations. The shortage of transplanted organs is a major public health problem worldwide. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services` Organ Supply and Transplantation Network, about 123,000 patients are on transplant waiting lists in the U.S. and about 300,000 patients waiting for an organ transplant in China (The Economist 2014). In the United States, the median wait time for a kidney transplant in 2014 was more than three and a half years (National Kidney Foundation 2014). The situation is similar in the United Kingdom (Department of Health 2014). In addition, the size of the waiting lists does not even fully reflect the real need, as doctors are sometimes reluctant to list patients who they believe do not have a realistic chance of getting an organ on time. (See other Internet resources below.) But even if altruism can survive this first challenge, there is a second reason to question its importance in the debate over the legality of organ sales. This is the distinction between cases where altruism is obligatory (where there is a moral duty to help others) and those where altruism is superior (morally good, but not morally required – beyond one`s own duty) (Wilkinson 2003).
This distinction is relevant for the following reason. If (say) altruistic kidney donations were morally obligatory, then it would be wrong to charge money for one`s organ (and arguably comply with such a request). But if, on the other hand, altruistic donations exceeded, it would not be wrong to ask for money for one`s organ. On the contrary, it would simply be non-superrogatory: maybe not good, but not wrong. With this distinction, one could therefore accept (at least in some cases) that altruistic gifts are good, while saying that there is nothing wrong with non-altruistic gifts – the fact is that if non-altruistic gifts are not as good as altruistic gifts, they are still (morally) allowed. This has implications for the kind of altruistic argument that can be made against organ sales. If it could be shown that altruistic gifts are mandatory, then the argument would be stronger, or at least simpler, because it would follow that the sale was bad (it is wrong to charge money for what you should release anyway). But if all that could be shown was that altruistic gifts are good, then it wouldn`t follow, or at least it wouldn`t directly follow that the sale is bad. Because it could simply be non-super-geosogatory (Wilkinson & Garrard 1996). Organ sales – for example, which allow or encourage consenting adults to become living kidney donors for money – have been proposed as a possible solution to the seemingly chronic shortage of organs to be transplanted. However, many people consider this idea despicable, arguing that the practice would be unethical and should be banned.
This entry describes some of the different possible types of organ sales, briefly states the arguments in its favor, and then examines the main arguments against it. The principle of non-commercialization of human organs has been enshrined in technical declarations such as the Istanbul Declaration and international legal instruments such as the Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking in Organs. Since the convention expired for signature in March, 16 countries have signed an update to their criminal laws to include its provisions, which include the purchase of organs and the use of organs purchased by surgeons, in the definition of “organ trafficking.” Together, characteristics (1) and (2) aim to exclude trafficking in farm organs from the poorest countries, while the prohibition of direct sale and allocation by a central agency ensures that organs do not go to those who can pay the best, but to those who need it most.
